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"There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."
-WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ahhhh! Life at nineteen... carefree youthfulness, Bacchanalian week-
ends, and unlimited free time. Life's biggest worries often amount to
nothing more than performing well on an exam, getting a date for the
weekend, or trying to adhere to this year's New Year's Resolution.
STOP!N!!!!!!
1
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Now, imagine that you are nineteen years old and require three
medications every day, without which you may die.' Your only means of
communication is a collection of noises that others have learned to interpret.
You never have more than fifteen to thirty minutes to yourself because you
are monitored on an hourly basis. You are prohibited from engaging in
sexual relations with the opposite sex because the possibility of pregnancy
could be fatal. An intercom has been installed in your bedroom to ensure
that you have no male visitors (and to provide medical supervision). To
most, this lifestyle seems like nothing short of a nightmare. To Catherine
White,2 this is reality.
Catherine is a nineteen-year-old mute woman who, since infancy, has
suffered from a moderately severe mental disability, grand mal epilepsy,
cerebral palsy, and scoliosis. Her mental and physical disabilities are
irreversible. Her I.Q. test results range between thirty and fifty on the
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale revised. Experts who have evaluated
Catherine agree that she has the mental age of a three to five-year-old
child.3
Over the course of her life, Catherine has experienced over fifty
seizures,4 some of which have lasted over sixty minutes.5 Any virus,
infection, cold, or fluctuation in her body temperature may cause her to have
a seizure.6 She is administered three drugs every day to control her
epilepsy.7 Without medication, she could experience status epilepticus,
causing her to seize repeatedly, and possibly die.8
1. The forthcoming facts approximate those in Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa.
Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175
(1995).
2. The name used in this article is fictitious, to protect Catherine's right to privacy.
3. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 430.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, Esq., Attorney for Catherine's mother (Feb.
20, 1995). The author would like to express his thanks to Ms. Engdahl for her assistance in
the preparation of this article.
7. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 430 ("Every day Catherine is administered three drugs,
Phenobarbital, Dilantin, and Tegritol, sometimes in toxic doses, to control her epilepsy.").
8. Id. "At one point in 1989, [Catherine's] behavior became more aggressive and self-
abusive. It was thought that her Dilantin level was too high and was possibly contributing
to her behavior problem." Id. Her neurologist consequently reduced her dosage of Dilantin.
As a result, she began to experience a "severe seizure, and her dosage of medication had to
be increased to a toxic level in order to stabilize her." Id. Catherine had a seizure again.
Her physician noted this episode as a reminder of how difficult it is to control Catherine's
epilepsy. Id.
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Catherine could also suffer severe, life threatening trauma in the event
that she became pregnant. 9 Her epilepsy could cause a spontaneous
abortion or premature birth."0 Testimony indicated that a pregnancy could
also be psychologically traumatic for Catherine in the unlikely event that she
could carry the pregnancy to term, and then have to be separated from the
child due to her inability to care for it."
Because of the life-threatening dangers associated with pregnancy,
Catherine's mother chose to request permission from the Orphan's Court to
have a tubal ligation performed on her daughter." As required by
9. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 432. Catherine could experience a combination of
psychological and physiological trauma if she were to become pregnant. This instability
could aggravate her already tenuously controlled condition. See generally ERNST
NIEDERMEYER, EPILEPSY GUIDE: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF EPILEPTIC SEIZURE
DISORDERS 212 (1983) (explaining how pregnancy may aggravate seizure disorder); S. Koch
et al., Obstetric Complications in Pregnancies of Epileptic Mothers and Their Obstetric
Histories, in EPILEPSY, PREGNANCY, AND THE CHILD 91 (1982) (providing results of various
studies indicating complications suffered by epileptics during pregnancy); C.M. Lander &
M.J. Eadie, Plasma Antiepileptic Drug Concentrations During Pregnancy, 32 EPILEPSIA 257
(1991) (providing results of study confirming lower plasma antiepileptic drug ("AED")
concentrations in epileptics during pregnancy which may, as direct consequence, expose
patients with active epileptic disorders to heightened risk of increased seizure activity).
Catherine suffers from grand mal epileptic seizures which have lasted in excess of 60
minutes. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 430. In some years of her life, Catherine has
experienced over 50 seizures. Id. Such seizures are also termed "status epilepticus" because
they are very prolonged. NIEDERMEYER, supra, at 78. For individuals who suffer status
epilepticus grand meal seizures during pregnancy, mortality of the fetus is high and maternal
mortality is considerable. I at 212. In one study of 29 patients with status epilepticus
during pregnancy, 9 of the 29 patients died, and at least 14 of the 29 fetuses died in utero
or shortly after birth. K. Teramo and V.K. Hiilesmaa, Pregnancy and Fetal Complications
in Epileptic Pregnancies: Review of the Literature, in EPILEPSY, PREGNANCY, AND THE
CHILD, supra, at 54. The life-threatening risks posed to Catherine in the event that she
became pregnant were not in dispute. Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, supra note
6.
10. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 430.
11. IU In addition to the anxiety she would suffer as a result of being separated from
her child, research indicates that there may be psychological problems associated with the
pregnancy itself for a woman in Catherine's position. Dieter Schmidt, The Effect of
Pregnancy on the Natural History of Epilepsy: Review of the Literature, in EPILEPSY,
PREGNANCY, AND THE CHILD, supra note 9, at 8 ('The fear of the potential risk of giving
birth to a child with epilepsy, malformations, or functional defects may be overwhelming,"
"[t]he psychosomatics of pregnancy may contribute to the outcome of epilepsy during
pregnancy," and the "[l]oss of sleep or pregnancy-induced changes in sleep physiology,
anxiety-induced hyperventilation, or fatigue, may increase the seizure frequency.").
12. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 3, Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(No. 91-2970). Catherine's mother was quoted as saying, "[I] just wanted to see her
19961 1325
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Pennsylvania law, Catherine's mother sought appointment as her guardian
with specific authority to consent to the sterilization procedure.' 3  The
court of Common Pleas granted her such authority.14 This decision was
subsequently affirmed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
15
This note analyzes the constitutional implications of involuntary
sterilization as applied to the mentally disabled, when sought strictly out of
medical necessity. Part I discusses the case of Estate of C.W. Specifically,
it touches upon the common law sources which laid the groundwork for
Pennsylvania's best interests requirement for involuntary sterilization. Part
I argues that the sterilization of Catherine was lawfully granted. Part II will,
on a global level, trace the historical evolution of the eugenics movement
from which the court's current skepticism towards involuntary sterilization
lies. Part III explains the current status of sterilization. Part IV outlines the
evolution of the modem right to privacy, argues that the fundamental right
to sexuality is implicit in both the right to privacy and in the First
Amendment right to self-expression, and explains the right to habilitation.
Part V argues that the court's granting of authorization to perform the
sterilization procedure served to justly uphold Catherine's constitutional
rights to privacy, sexuality, and habilitation. Finally, part VI concludes with
a balancing test, which balances the state's interest in protecting Catherine's
rights to privacy16 and procreational freedom against her mother's interest
in protecting Catherine's rights to privacy, sexuality, habilitation, and life
itself.
[Catherine] have a life.. . . I want to do the best I can to protect her from any problems
happening in her life." Id.
13. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (1995). The court, upon petition and hearing and
upon the presentation of clear and convincing evidence, may find a person domiciled in the
commonwealth to be incapacitated and appoint a guardian or guardians of his person or
estate. Id.
14. Estate of C.W., No. 87-3107, slip. op. at 56 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas, Phila. County
Feb. 28, 1990), aff'd, 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
15. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
16. The right to privacy which the state asserts on Catherine's behalf relates to her
freedom from bodily intrusion. Alternatively, the right to privacy asserted by her mother is
the right for Catherine to be let alone, free from invasive state interests controlling her well-
being.
1326 [Vol. 20
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II. GENERAL OvERvIEw: ESTATE OF C.W.
A. Catherine's Background
Since the age of twelve, Catherine has lived in a community living
arrangement ("CLA") 17 because she had become increasingly difficult to
care for at home." In view of her potential proximity to other males living
in the CLA, 19 her overly affectionate nature,2' and her heightened sexual
awareness,21 there exists a strong likelihood that Catherine could become
sexually involved and become pregnant.22 In the event that she did
become pregnant, her epileptic condition could very well put her and her
fetus into a life-endangering situation.
17. Community living arrangements such as the one where Catherine lives are intended
to provide a cooperative or structured small group living arrangement that is part of the
community, as opposed to an institutional system closed off from the community. See
generally HANDBOOK OF MENTAL RETARDATION (Johnny L. Matson & James A. Mulick
eds., 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
18. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 431 (stating that while at home, Catherine sometimes
refused to eat or take medications and she often disrupted rest of family).
19. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 6, Estate of C.W (No. 91-2970). At one time,
there were three male residents living in the CLA whose ages ranged from 17 to 22. Id.
20. Ud at 5-6. Testimony indicated that Catherine is particularly affectionate, even with
strangers. Because she has been so sheltered through her developmental years, she has
learned to trust everyone with whom she comes into contact. She believes that everyone is
as caring as her parents and family, so consequently assumes that they are her true friends.
Id. After conducting an interview of Catherine, the trial judge said that Catherine "willingly
hugged everyone in the room including people whom she had never met." Estate of C.W.,
640 A.2d at 431. She was described by the judge to be "extremely suggestible, compliant,
and anxious to please." ld.
21. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 4, 5, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970). Catherine is
"sexually interested" and "aggressive physically and sexually with other people." Id. at 5.
More than one witness testified that Catherine appears "to crave physical contact with
others." Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 434. A psychologist who examined Catherine
indicated that she was "keenly aware of her sexuality and femininity and uses both whenever
possible, even where inappropriate." Id The record also indicated that "there had been
increased kissing involvement" between Catherine and her boyfriend. Id A doctor who
performed a physical examination of Catherine revealed that "she did not have an intact
hymen." Id.
22. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 434 ("The record supports the trial court's finding that
[Catherine] might be willing to engage in voluntary sexual intercourse."); see also discussion
supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
Adler 1327
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Therefore, out of medical necessity,2 3 Catherine's mother wished to
undertake whatever means necessary to protect her daughter from becoming
pregnant. While many different contraceptives were initially consid-
ered-barrier methods such as an IUD or diaphragm, hormonal treatments
such as Depo-Provera, or the birth control pill, and a tubal ligation 4- -
medical testimony indicated that, in light of her tenuously controlled
epilepsy, the safest available option25 for Catherine was to undergo a
laparoscopic tubal sterilization. 6
B. Procedural Requirements and Holding
Pennsylvania courts follow the precedent set by a 1982 case, In re
Terwilliger,27 which established Pennsylvania's standards governing the
process through which a guardian is granted specific authority to consent to
the involuntary sterilization of a mentally disabled person.2 After
Terwilliger, courts require that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking
the approval of the authorized procedure.29 Courts additionally require that
the party prove, through clear and convincing evidence, that such an
operation is in the "best interests" of the mentally disabled person.3" Once
the petition for authorization is filed with the court, the judge appoints a
guardian ad litem who is responsible for asserting and defending the rights
of the individual at trial.3  After the guardian has been appointed, the
court must find the following: first, that the individual lacks the capacity
to make a decision about the sterilization and that the incapacity is unlikely
23. Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, Esq., Attorney for Catherine's mother
(Feb. 1, 1995).
24. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 437.
25. See Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 11, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970). The court-
appointed medical expert, Catherine's treating physician, petitioner's medical expert, and a
psychiatrist all testified that the appropriate medical procedure for Catherine is a tubal
ligation (laparoscopy). Id.
26. See SARAH F. HAAvIK & KARL A. MENNINGER, II, SEXUALITY, LAW, AND THE
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON 109 (1981). A relatively simple operation, the "tubal
sterilization" or "tubal ligation" procedure can be done on an outpatient basis. The patient
is given general anesthesia, and a small incision is made near the navel. A laparoscope is
inserted to enable the physician to view the Fallopian tubes. The tubes are then cut and
cauterized. "The entire procedure can be completed in fifteen minutes." Id.
27. 450 A.2d 1376 (Pa. Super. 1982).
28. Il at 1382-84.
29. See id. at 1382.
30. eL
31. kla at 1383.
[Vol. 201328
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to change in the near future,32 and second, that the person is capable of
reproduction.33 Once these findings have been made, the court proceeds
to its ultimate determination which is whether the sterilization is in the
woman's best interests.34 The Orphan's Court appointed the mother as
guardian,35 and the case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
which held that the best interests of Catherine required that her mother be
appointed guardian with authority to consent to the tubal ligation proce-
dure.36
C. Best Interests Determination
Pennsylvania, like many other states,37 has never had a statute
governing the process through which one may receive authorization for the
involuntary sterilization procedure.38 Instead, the decision rests entirely
with the judiciary.39 The court's power to render such a decision stems
from the common law doctrine of parens patriae,4 which enables it to
32. Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1383.
33. ld.
34. See id.
[I]t must be established that sterilization is the only practicable means of
contraception, i.e., all less drastic contraceptive methods, including supervision,
education and training are unworkable and detailed medical testimony must
show that the sterilization procedure requested is the least significant intrusion
necessary to protect the interests of the individual.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. Estate of C.W., No. 87-3107, slip. op. at 56 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas, Phila. County
Feb. 28, 1990), aff-d, 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995). Catherine's mother was appointed as a
guardian for the purpose of approving the sterilization. Id.
36. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
37. Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Wyoming have never
had a compulsory sterilization statute. Richard A. Estacio, Sterilization of the Mentally
Disabled in Pennsylvania: Three Generations Without Legislative Guidance are Enough, 92
DICK. L. REv. 411 (1988). As of 1988, most states do not have sterilization statutes,
including: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id at 423.
38. Id
39. Id.
40. Parenspatriae literally means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY
1114 (6th ed. 1991). The phrase refers to the role of the state as a sovereign and guardian
1996] 1329
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protect those individuals within the state who, because of a legal disability,
are incapable of protecting themselves.4 In making the decision whether
to authorize an involuntary sterilization procedure, the court may only
consider the best interests of the incompetent, and not that of the parents,
guardian, or society."
Perhaps the most influential case to utilize the "best interests" test was
In re Grady.43 In Grady, it was emphasized that in spite of the disabled
person's lack of input during the decision-making process, the court's
decision was "designed to further the same interests she might pursue had
she the ability to decide for herself."'  The court further provided that its
role was not that of an interpreter, but rather a surrogate.45 To help
facilitate the best interests determination, the court provided the following
guidelines to be considered:
1) The possibility that the disabled person can become pregnant.
2) The possibility that the incompetent person will experience
trauma or psychological damage if she becomes pregnant or gives birth,
and, conversely, the possibility of trauma or psychological damage from
the sterilization operation.
3) The likelihood that the individual will voluntarily engage in
sexual activity or be exposed to situations where sexual intercourse is
imposed upon her.
4) The inability of the disabled person to understand reproduction
or contraception and the likely permanence of that inability.
5) The feasibility and medical advisability of less drastic means
of contraception, both at the present time and under foreseeable future
circumstances.
6) The advisability of sterilization at the time of the application
rather than in the future....
to individuals who are under some type of legal disability, such as juveniles, or the insane.
Id.
41. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 479 (N.J. 1981).
42. In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. 1982); see, e.g., In re Grady, 426
A.2d at 467. Terwilliger relied heavily on many of requirements laid out by Supreme Court
of New Jersey in Grady, including requirement that court consider only best interest of the
incompetent.
43. 426 A.2d 467, 479 (N.J. 1981).
44. Id at 467.
45. Id
1330 [Vol. 20
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7) The ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the
possibility that the person may at some future date be able to marry
and, with a spouse, care for a child.
8) Evidence that scientific advances may occur within the
foreseeable future which will make possible either improvement of the
individual's condition or alternative and less drastic sterilization
procedures.
9) A demonstration that the proponents of sterilization are seeking
it in good faith and that their primary concern is for the best interest of
the incompetent person rather than their own or the public's conve-
nience.
This non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered was adopted by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Terwilliger to comprise part of its "best
interests" test, and was subsequently relied upon in the Estate of C.W'
The most heavily debated point in the case was whether the sterilization of
Catherine was the "only practicable means of contraception."4  As
provided in Terwilliger, this determination is reached through the use of a
"least restrictive means" test, which requires that "all other contraceptive
alternatives be found unworkable."
49
D. Sterilization as the Least Restrictive Means of Contraception
The "least restrictive means" test requires an evaluation and comparison
of the net benefits associated with each available alternative to determine
which is the most practicable. The contraceptive options under initial
consideration included barrier methods such as the intra-uterine device
("IUD") or diaphragm, and hormonal methods such as Depo-Provera or oral
contraceptives. Evidence indicates that the health risks associated with these
contraceptives are non-existent with a tubal ligation procedure.
An IUD poses such potential risks as the perforation of the uterine wall,
pelvic inflammatory disease, cramping pain, spontaneous expulsion, heavy
bleeding between periods, and pregnancy failures.5" The IUD must also
46. Id at 483.
47. 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. 1994), and cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
48. Il at 433.
49. In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1383.
50. JEFFREY S. VICTOR, HUMAN SEXuALrrY: A SocIo PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 49
(1980).
1996] 1331
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be replaced every year.5" The necessity of an annual medical procedure is
more intrusive than the single procedure which would be necessary if
Catherine underwent a tubal ligation. 2 A diaphragm was not seriously
considered because it would require a high level of motivation and cognitive
understanding on the part of Catherine. 3 Hormonal treatments such as
Depo-Provera have been linked with cervical cancer after prolonged use. 4
Other reported problems with the use of this product include irregular
bleeding and a higher risk of breast cancer.5 Furthermore, while the
physical variations caused by the product may pose little, if any, danger to
healthy people, Catherine, as a severe epileptic, would be subjected to a
considerably higher risk of destabilization, grand mal seizures, and potential
status epilepticus 6 Finally, oral contraceptives such as the birth control
pill increase the risk of liver cancer and may increase the risk of breast and
cervical cancer.57 The hormonal changes normally induced by the pill may
also pose additional dangers to Catherine's already barely manageable
epileptic condition. 8
51. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 438.
52, Id.
53. WILLIAM S. ROWE & SANDRA SAVAGE, SEXUALITY AND THE DEVELOPMENTALLY
HANDICAPPED 51 (1987). Catherine's intellectual level was that of a three to five-year-old.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
54. Patricia Bailey & Joseph Sanfillipo, Contraception in the Adolescent, in CONTRACEP-
TION 105 (1993). In a case controlled study conducted in Latin America, cervical cancer
risks appeared to be associated with prolonged use. Short-term use of this product appears
to be associated with a lower incidence of cervical cancer. Id.
55. Id.
56. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 38, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970). Catherine's
epilepsy is tenuously controlled. Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, Esq., Attorney
for Catherine's mother (February 27, 1995). Her medical condition is so fragile, that the
slightest cold, or change in body temperature could cause her to have seizures. The severity
of Catherine's epileptic condition was not a matter of dispute. Id.
57. Malcolm C. Pike & Darcy V. Spicer, Oral Contraceptives and Cancer, in
CONTRACEPTION 67 (Donna Shoupe, et al. eds., 1993). While there are many types of oral
contraceptives, the side-effects associated with the one referred to in the accompanying text
have been linked with the use of "combination-type" oral contraceptives which are the most
commonly used. Each pill contains both an estrogen and a progestin. Id The alternative
pill, the "minipill," contains progestin only. Id. at 95.
58. Catherine's mother was primarily concerned with potential drug interactions with
her other medication and how they could detrimentally affect Catherine's health. Telephone
Interview with Marta Engdahl, Esq., Attorney for Catherine's mother (Aug. 11, 1995). See
Martha J. Morrel, Hormones and Epilepsy Through the Lifetime, EPILEPSIA 33 (Supp. S49-61
1992).
1332 [Vol. 20
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By comparison, the tubal ligation procedure carries with it minimal, if
any, danger to Catherine's health.59 "Physicians as a group are generally
in favor of sterilizing developmentally disabled individuals and often
encourage the operation. '' 60 A recent study found that women who have
had tubal sterilizations were two-thirds less likely to develop ovarian cancer
than other women.6' Ovarian cancer kills 12,000 women in the United
States every year.62 Only thirty-nine percent of women who become
afflicted with ovarian cancer will survive more than five years. 63 This
provides a compelling argument for women who are sure that they do not
want to have children.64 Even before this study was conducted, however,
another study which was designed to gauge women's satisfaction after
having undergone the tubal ligation procedure revealed that ninety percent
Hormones influence brain function from gestation throughout life and may affect
the seizure threshold by altering neuronal excitability. Estrogen enhances and
progesterone diminishes neuronal excitability experimentally. . . . Hormonal
effects in the CSN [Central Nervous System] also depend on the region of the
brain in which the hormone acts. Sites of action for most steroid hormones
include the hypothalamus and limbic cortex, providing a mechanism for
modulating behavior and endocrine function. Seizure patterns may change at
certain life stages, perhaps as a result of alterations in hormones.... In some
women, fluctuations in hormones over the menstrual cycle appear to increase
seizure vulnerability, probably reflecting changes in relative amounts of estrogen
and progesterone.
Id. at S49.
59. See RowE & SAVAGE, supra note 53, at 47. The side effects for tubal ligation are
reportedly negligible. There may be minor post-surgery discomfort. Id.; see also HAAVIK
& MENNNGER, II, supra note 26, at 109 ("Complications of the operation are rare but
include hemorrhage, complications of general anesthesia, electrocoagulation bums, and
perforation of the uterus, bowel, and occasionally other organs."). One study of 2000 tubal
sterilizations reported a complication incidence of 3.9%, with hemorrhage being the most
frequent complication. Id. at 110.
60. HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 113. A survey of 652 professionals
and parents of retarded children revealed that 85.8% either favored or strongly favored
voluntary sterilization for mentally disabled persons. Id. at 114.
61. Linda Carrol, Beyond Birth Control: Women Who Never Considered Tubal
Sterilization Might Be Thinking Twice After a Study Shows It Offers Some Protection Against
Ovarian Cancer, NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 1993, at 61.
62. Id.
63. IcE
64. See id. ("Several doctors said [] that the new study presents a powerful argument
for the operation if a woman is sure she will not want to have children in the future."). Dr.
Robert C. Wallach, director of gynecologic oncology at the New York University School of
Medicine, reportedly said, "'I'm very happy that we have this potential preventative measure
for one of the worst diseases we treat."' Id.
1996] 1333
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were satisfied with their operation and would elect to repeat it if they had
to do it over again.65 In the unlikely event that Catherine's mental or
physical condition changes, and she can experience childbirth in the absence
of the aforesaid risks, the sterilization may be reversed.66
E. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Johnson, writing for the dissent, focused his attack on the
majority's conclusion that Catherine's sterilization was the least restrictive
means of contraception available to her.67 Citing our country's history of
the eugenic sterilization of mentally disabled persons,68 the dissent
emphasized the need to impose the least restrictive alternative test.69
Adhering to the "clear and convincing" standard, Justice Johnson stated that
the evidence failed to show that the tubal ligation procedure was in
Catherine's best interests. 0 In stating that the court "may only consider
the best interests of the incompetent ... [and] not the interests or conve-
nience of that individual's parents, guardian, or of society, 71 Justice
Johnson unveiled his skepticism towards the majority's interpretation of the
best interests test. He reminded the court that its best interests determination
was not to be based on a balancing test of the pros and cons associated with
the various contraceptives.72 Instead the court must find that other
65. HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 113. The sample was taken from 147
women who received counseling two to three months before sterilization. Five percent of
the women indicated that they would not repeat the operation, and five percent were
uncertain. Id.
66. See Victor Gomel, Tubal Reconstruction: Reversal of Female Sterilization By
Microsurgery, in FEMALE STERILIZATION 85, 85 (1980) ("Microsurgery offers the best chance
for a successful reversal of sterilization and a normal intrauterine pregnancy resulting in a
live birth."). Studies have shown that the procedure is reversible 80.8% of the time. Id.
67. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 440 (Pa. Super.) (Johnson, J., dissenting), stay
granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
68. See infra part HI.
69. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 441 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
70. Il at 442 (Johnson, J., dissenting). He based his opinion, in part, on the possibility
that new or safer methods of contraception may be available in the future. He also rejected
the argument that the mere chance of side affects associated with other alternative
contraceptives was a sufficient basis for rejecting a less intrusive method in favor of
sterilization. Id. at 444 (Johnson, J. dissenting). While medical testimony indicated that
other contraceptives had potential side affects, or potentially negative interactions with
Catherine's anti-epileptic medication, this was not proven with certainty. Id. (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
71. Id. at 440 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
72. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 445 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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contraceptives have been proven unworkable, and that the sterilization
procedure is the least significant intrusion necessary to protect Catherine's
best interests.73 Finally, he accused the majority of neglecting to address
Catherine's constitutional rights, specifically, her right to bodily integrity
and reproductive autonomy.74
Ill. THE ORIGIN OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION AS A PRODUCT
OF THE EARLY EUGENICS MOVEMENT
The term eugenics was coined by Sir Francis Galton who, in 1883,
defined it as the "study of the agencies under social control that may
improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically
or mentally." 5  Eugenics encompassed two different classifica-
tions-positive and negative-with essentially the same objective.76
Positive eugenics encouraged procreation between mates who shared the
most desirable genetic traits.77 This was assumed to ensure that future
offspring would be blessed with the optimal genetic makeup. Negative
eugenics was concerned with "curbing the fertility" of those who were
predicted to bear undesirable offspring.7 Included in this group were the
mentally ill, the mentally and physically handicapped, degenerates, and the
diseased.79 One of the tools of negative eugenics was compulsory steriliza-
tion. o
Predicated on Social Darwininst Herbert Spencer's "survival of the
fittest" doctrine, the eugenics philosophy was designed to engineer a better,
more capable society."1 The objective was to spread the message that
undesirable human traits were, in fact, "hereditary, and that good citizens
had a duty to promote the reproduction of fit stock and to discourage or
prevent reproduction of the unfit." 2 Further, "[t]he eugenists believed that
73. kL (Johnson, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 441.
75. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE
AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 356-57 (1937).
76. STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE: A HISTORY OF COERCIVE
STERILIZATION 2 (1988).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. J.H. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION: THE HISTORY OF THE SEXUAL STERILIZA-
TION MOVEMENT 129 (1932).
80. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 2.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 11.
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slow evolutionary progress was in the natural order of things," and such
progress was halted by society's efforts to protect "the socially inadequate
from extinction."83
The controversy started with Charles Darwin's On the Origin of
Species,84 which theorized that the idea of natural selection 5 was not
always "natural," and was sometimes the result of man's interference with
nature. 6 Though Darwin's viewpoints expressed in his book were not
based on any scientific evidence, they were influential nevertheless, because
of his sound reputation.87 In 1900, the laws of heredity developed by
Austrian monk Gregor Mendel helped further lay the groundwork for the
Eugenics movement. 8 Mendel's research on the crossbreeding of peas
resulted in the discovery that inherited traits were actually inherited in the
form of a pair of determiners (later called genes), one from each parent.8 9
What scientists today characterize as dominant and recessive genes
originated from Mendel's research.' Mendel hypothesized that it may be
possible to predict one's genetic composition based on the dominant and
recessive gene pools of one's parents.91 These discoveries were thought
to have provided society with a justification for considering the use of
compulsory sterilization as a means of cleansing the gene pool.
One of the earliest proponents of compulsory sterilization was Dr.
Robert Rentoul.92 His theory of sterilization was legitimized on a medical
and social basis. Because it was assumed that diseases, idiocy, and socially
deviant characteristics were inheritable, sterilization was argued to be an
efficient means to eliminate the possibility of the affliction of such traits on
future offspring.93 During the period from 1912 to 1916, several books
83. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1426 (1981).
84. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
85. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 5. Darwin's concept of "natural selection" served as
the genesis for Spencer's subsequent "survival of the fittest" doctrine. Id.
86. IdL
87. Id Few eugenists were actually trained geneticists. Id.
88. DEUTSCH, supra note 75, at 356.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. See generally id. (providing a detailed explanation of Mendelian genetics).
92. See generally ROBERT RENTOUL, PROPOSED STERILIZATION OF CERTAIN MENTAL
AND PHYSICAL DEGENERATES-AN APPEAL TO ASYLUM MANAGERS AND OTHERS (1903);
ROBERT RENTOUL, RACE CULTURE, OR RACE SUICIDE? A PLEA FOR THE UNBORN (1906)
(both advocating compulsory sterilization of the mentally disabled).
93. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 11.
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theorized that mental retardation was largely hereditary, and was the root of
social evils.94 Estimates of the number of cases of retardation which were
attributable to heredity ranged to ninety percent and greater.95 While no
conclusive modem research has been performed in this area, several studies
have attempted to identify the likelihood that mental retardation may be
passed down to one's offspring.96 Three studies in particular97 indicated
that, in the event that one or both parents are mentally disabled, the
likelihood that the offspring will inherit the condition is roughly eleven
percent. 98
In the earlier part of the twentieth century, however, society was
ultimately convinced that mental disabilities were inheritable and the
"mother of crime, pauperism and degeneracy."99 It was said that:
The feebleminded are a parasitic, predatory class, never capable of self-
support or of managing their own affairs. They cause unutterable
sorrow at home and are a menace and danger to the community.
Feebleminded women are almost invariably immoral, and if at large
usually become carriers of venereal disease or give birth to children
who are as defective as themselves .... Every feebleminded person,
especially the high-grade imbecile, is a potential criminal, needing only
the proper environment and opportunity for the development and
expression of his criminal tendencies."
"Involuntary" or compulsory sterilization found its beginning as a
punishment for convicted criminals, rather than as strictly a eugenic
94. See DEUTSCH, supra note 75, at 358, 359 (naming some of most celebrated
publications, including: CHARLES B. DAVENPORT & FLORENCE H. DANIELSON, THE HILL
FOLK (1912); ARTHUR H. ESTABROOK, THE JUKES IN 1915 (1915); ARTHUR H. ESTABROOK
& CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, THE NAm FAMILY (1912); ELIZABETH S. KITE, THE PINEYS
(1913); and MARY S. KOSTIR, THE FAMILY OF.SAM S xTY (1916)).
95. Id. at 357.
96. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 286.
97. Id. The following studies established a likelihood of 11% that a child will inherit
a mental disability from his parent if one or both are mentally disabled: Brandon, 1957;
Scally, 1968; Shaw & Wright, 1960. Id. When one parent is mentally disabled and there
is already one mentally disabled child in the family, the recurrence risk rises to nearly 20%.
Id.
98. Id.
99. DEUTSCH, supra note 75, at 359.
100. Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
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measure. 10  In 1855, the Kansas Territorial Legislature legalized the
castration of any black or "mulatto" convicted of rape, attempted rape or
kidnapping of a white woman."4 Towards the end of the nineteenth
century, the European theory of "degeneration" or "eugenics" found its way
to the United States. 3
Prior to 1900, however, support for sterilization was quite limited."°
Surgical procedures like castration resulted in asexualization, disturbing the
hormonal balance, and various other psychological and physiological
effects.' '5 These undesirable side effects forced those who supported such
measures to justify them on the basis of their punitive or therapeutic value
in addition to their eugenic benefits."° Along with the discovery of less
intrusive surgical procedures0 7 came a more powerful justification for
sterilization to be used for solely eugenic reasons. Dr. Harry Sharp's
discovery of the vasectomy as a safe, inexpensive and quick medical
procedure revolutionized eugenic thinking." The procedure did not affect
the libido, despite its ultimate aim of preventing fertilization.1 9 Between
1899 and 1907, Sharpe performed 465 compulsory sterilization operations
101. See TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 49-50; see also LANDMAN, supra note 79, at 51
(explaining that history includes various cultures who used compulsory sterilization for one
reason or another).
Apostate Jews, who dared revert to Judaism, were in the Middle Ages castrated;
negroes in the pre-Civil War days were castrated at times as a punishment or as
a method of developing more sturdy workers; Mohammedans frequently castrated
young boys for purposes of maintaining their harems; and the choir boys in the
Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages, until forbidden by Pope Leo
XIII, were made eunuchs before puberty so that they might retain their soprano
voices as they grew to adulthood. The ancient peoples-such as the people of
the Bible, the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Chinese, the Hindus, the Greeks, the
Persians, and the Romans-castrated their captives, criminals, and slaves for
penal purposes.
Id.
102. See TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 49.
103. Id.
104. Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1429.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (explaining various types of sterilization including the salpingectomy-cutting
and tying the Fallopian tubes-and the vasectomy-cutting and tying the vas deferens).
These procedures require comparatively minor surgery and have none of the side effects of
castration. Id
108. See TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 50.
109. Id. (explaining Sharp's view that "each man 'is in no way impaired for his pursuit
of life, liberty and happiness, but is effectively sterilized"').
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on male inmates at the Indiana State Reformatory."' Sharpe's perceived
success in eugenics served as a prelude for its ultimate legislation.
"Probably the first explicitly eugenic legislation in the [United States]
was Connecticut's 1896 law preventing marriage to, or sexual relations with,
the eugenically unfit.""' The first American eugenic sterilization bill,
introduced in 1897 by the Michigan legislature, was never enacted." 2 On
April 9, 1907, Indiana became the first state to enact legislation which
allowed compulsory sterilization of the feebleminded."' Other states were
quick to follow." 4  One of the best examples of how determined some
states were to carry out such laws is reflected by the sterilization laws of
Kansas, first passed in 1913.215 Kansas' first sterilization law made it a
crime for any managing officer of a state institution to fail to recommend
the sterilization of any inmate unfit to procreate." 6 Any officer failing to
do so was fined up to $100, or imprisoned up to thirty days, or both." 7
The 1924 passing of Virginia's sterilization statute is of particular
significance because it was the first statute of its kind to ultimately be
deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States."' The
Virginia law was written in such a way so as to avoid any constitutional
infractions." 9 "The [Virginia] legislature did not intend sterilization to be
a punitive measure, but rather,[as] a measure in 'the best interests of the
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 51. The statute allowed for the procedure to be
performed if it was determined that there was no probability of the victim's mental
improvement. Id.
114. Id. Washington enacted a compulsory sterilization law for convicted criminals in
1909. Id; see also HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1922). California was the third state to enact legislation for compulsory sterilization in April
of 1909. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 51. Its motive was primarily eugenic, and partly
punitive. Connecticut followed with its compulsory sterilization statute passed in August,
1909. It, too, was primarily eugenic. Nevada approved a sterilization statute in March,
1911. Iowa passed legislation in March, 1911; New Jersey in April, 1911, North Dakota in
March, 1913. IM at 65. Several other states followed suit. d; see also HARRY H.
LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 7 (1930) [hereinafter
LAUGHLIN, LEGAL STATUS] (stating that by January 1, 1930, 23 different states had enacted
eugenical sterilization statutes of one type or another).
115. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 65.
116. I&
117. Id.
118. LAUGHLIN, LEGAL STATUS, supra note 114, at 7.
119. Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1436.
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patients and of society.' z120 In April of 1927, the landmark case of Buck
v. Bell' was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. In
that case, the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-
minded for the state of Virginia, had requested and performed a sterilization
procedure on Carrie Buck. 122  Buck was believed 123 to be a mentally
disabled daughter of a mentally disabled woman, both of whom lived in the
same institution."2 The proponents of eugenics and compulsory steriliza-
tion used the Bucks as a confirmation of their theories of heredity. Carrie's
mother had registered a mental age of less than eight on the Stanford
revision of the Binet-Simon test, while Carrie had a mental age of nine."
120. Id. (quoting, in part, 1924 VA. AcTs ch. 394).
121. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
122. See LANDMAN, supra note 79, at 97.
123. Subsequent literature revealed that Carrie Buck was not mentally ill or retarded.
See Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 331, 336 (1985)
(quoting a letter received from Paul A. Lombardo of the School of Law at the University of
Virginia).
As for Carrie, when I met her she was reading newspapers daily and joining a
more literate friend to assist at regular bouts with the crossword puzzles. She
was not a sophisticated woman, and lacked social graces, but mental health
professionals who examined her in later life confirmed my impressions that she
was neither mentally ill nor retarded.
Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Paul A. Lombardo, Associate Professor & Director
of The Center For Mental Health Law at the Institute of Law, Psychiatry & Public Policy at
the University of Virginia, and a leading scholar of Buck v. Bell (August 23, 1995) (stating
that: "Carrie exhibited no difficulty in speaking with me. The clinicians who had
interviewed and evaluated her found no evidence of mental retardation.").
124. LANDMAN, supra note 79, at 97.
125. Id. at 98; see also HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 286 (discussing the statistical
probability of mentally disabled parents birthing mentally disabled offspring). The Stanford-
Binet is one of the most commonly used instruments for evaluating intellectual functioning
in the mentally disabled. It seeks to identify patterns of intellectual functioning which it then
compares to other individuals' of the same age. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 229 (Michael
Kindred et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter Kindred].
[Intelligence] [t]est performance might indicate differences in mental capacity
among [people] who "have had an equal opportunity to learn certain types of
cognitive, linguistic and mathematical skills and to acquire certain types of
information; if they were equally motivated to learn these skills and to acquire
this information; if they are equally motivated to exert themselves in a test
situation and equally familiar with the demands of the test situation; if they were
equally free of emotional . . . and biological . . . difficulties which might
interfere with their performance."
Id. (citations omitted).
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Their relationship as parent/child served to show that mental disabilities
were transmitted genetically, and could be prevented through sterilization.
At trial, Buck's attorney argued that Virginia's sterilization statute was
a violation of Carrie Buck's constitutional right of "bodily integrity," and
consequently a deprivation of "life" without due process of law. 2 6 He
also attacked the statute on the ground that it violated the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 7 In an
eight-to-one decision, the Court supported the sterilization statute."n
The lone dissenter, Justice Butler, neglected to provide a written
opinion." 9 Speaking for the majority, Justice Holmes held that the
procedural aspects of the statute satisfied the due process arguments and that
the uniform application of the statute to all members of the class of mentally
disabled people in state institutions complied with equal protection 30
Justice Holmes said of Carrie Buck:
"[H]er welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization."
• . . It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind.... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.13 1
Currently, the holding in Buck v. Bell has not been overturned.
Nonetheless, most scholars suggest that the case would be overruled, if
presented to the Supreme Court of the United States today.32  Having
established the historical context of compulsory sterilization, this casenote
will proceed to analyze the C.W. case on a factual and constitutional basis,
arguing that the operation was required out of medical necessity and
ultimately served to uphold Catherine's constitutional rights. As shall be
seen, the aforementioned eugenic or punitive justifications for the procedure
are nonexistent in this case.
126. Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1447 (citations omitted).
127. Id. (citations omitted).
128. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
129. See Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1450.
130. Id.
131. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (citations omitted).
132. See Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1456.
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IV. THE MODERN STATUS OF STERILIZATION
Currently, there are ten states which still have compulsory sterilization
statutes. 33 Just twenty years ago, there were over twice as many such
statutes."M Some jurisdictions have banned the sterilization of the mental-
ly disabled altogether. 135 There are three factors which have helped shape
society's current sterilization laws: 136  "the discrediting of the eugenic
theory, the development of the constitutional doctrine of reproductive
privacy, and the changing conception of mental retardation."' 137
With the erosion of the scientific community's support for eugenics
came society's rejection as well. Elizabeth Scott notes: "[rieports of
widespread sterilization in Nazi Germany led to increased criticism of
eugenic sterilization laws.' 38 By the 1960s, involuntary sterilization was
often deemed an unjustified intrusion by the state on an individual's liberty
and privacy. 39 Moreover, the evolution of the constitutional right of
reproductive privacy has spawned a greater interest among lawmakers to
133. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-49-205 to -304 (Michie 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 5701-5716 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-3 (1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to -3909
(1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1972); N.C. GEN.STAT. §§ 35-39 to -43 (1994);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.225 to .295 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-6-101 to -6-116
(1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8705-8712 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2975 to -2977
(Michie 1994).
134. Estacio, supra note 37, at 417.
135. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights
and Family Privacy, 1986 DuKE L.J. 806, 817 n.31 (1986). "No person with developmental
disabilities who has not given consent shall be sterilized." Id. (quoting COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 27-10.5-128(2) (Supp. 1985)). In 1981, the Colorado Supreme Court carved out an
exception to allow sterilization of mentally disabled minors. Id. (citing In re A.W., 637 P.2d
366, 375 (Colo. 1981)). "A California law prohibiting sterilization of all persons under
conservatorship, CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356 (1981) was struck down in 1985 in Conservator-
ship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985). Several courts have effectively banned
sterilization by refusing to allow sterilization in the absence of statutory authority." Id.
Federal law prohibits governmental funding of the sterilization of minors or mentally
incompetent persons who are incompetent to consent to the operation. See infra text
accompanying note 163.
136. See Scott, supra note 135, at 809.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 811.
139. Id. The right to reproductive privacy in the 1960s and 1970s has affected the
constitutional analysis of sterilization laws. Id. n.17. Because the eugenic sterilization laws
infringed a fundamental right to privacy and procreation, the laws are subjected to strict
scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to the means they seek to achieve. This contrasts to
the rationality review previously used by the court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Scott, supra note 135, at 811.
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address the reproductive rights of the mentally disabled."14 It is well
estab-lished that normal adults and mature minors are entitled to avoid
unwanted pregnancies via contraception or sterilization.'41 There is a
consensus within the legal community that mentally disabled persons are
entitled to the same right of reproductive privacy as normal people.'42
This relatively newfound sense of legislative acceptance for the mentally
disabled reflects changes in society's attitudes as well.' As a result,
today's programs for the mentally disabled strive to encourage the person
to live as independently and self-sufficiently as possible." This is
formally recognized as "normalization.""
"Normalization," or "habilitation" refers to the "mainstreaming" of
mentally disabled individuals."4 The constitutional right to habilitation
for the mentally retarded was first articulated in the landmark case of Wyatt
v. Stickney,'47 in 1972. a14 The court held that a mentally retarded person
had an "'inviolable constitutional right to habilitation."' ' The term was
originally intended to describe the bundle of constitutional rights which be-
longed to mentally disabled persons who were confined to institutions. 50
Though the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet recognized
habilitation as a constitutional right,5 the right is grounded in the legal
doctrines of substantive due process, equal protection guarantees, and the
constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Today's laws concerning involuntary sterilization are designed to
protect the interests of the mentally disabled rather than those of soci-
ety.'53 There are primarily two types of tests used when a state considers
permitting an involuntary sterilization procedure, the substituted judgment
140. Id. at 812.
141. Id. at 813.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 814.
144. See Scott, supra note 135, at 815.
145. Id.
146. See Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 8, Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.
1994) (No. 91-2970).
147. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
148. Kindred, supra note 125, at 385.
149. Id. at 400 (quoting Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 390).
150. Id. at 386-87.
151. Id.; cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 331 (1982) (holding that mentally
disabled persons have a fundamental right to minimally adequate training).
152. Kindred, supra note 125, at 390.
153. See Scott, supra note 135, at 807.
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test, and the best interests test.- 4 Both tests proclaim to preserve the
rights of self-determination of the mentally disabled. 55 The substituted
judgment test is frequently used in cases where the individual was, at one
time, competent to make decisions.'56 It allows a court to render a
decision consistent with that of the patient, were she competent to do
so." 7 In its consideration, the court will examine any evidence which
tends to indicate the individual's intent.'58 The difficulty with the substi-
tuted judgment test is that the court cannot always infer the patient's intent.
Consequently, most courts have relied on the best interests test.
Courts which use the best interests standard are motivated by the
interests of the person who is mentally disabled and perhaps not competent
to make a well-informed decision.'59 Of the two tests, the best interests
standard accommodates itself to the particular needs of the individual, as
opposed to the substituted judgment test which arbitrarily attempts to guess
whatever the individual's preference may be. For the foregoing reasons,
most states use the best interests test in determining whether or not to grant
authority to perform the involuntary sterilization procedure. 60
Due to the problems of consent, lack of implementation of the laws,
and a growing movement supported by civil libertarians, the incidence of
reported sterilization has fallen in the last several years.161 In addition, the
1974 decision of Relf v. Weinberger, 62 prohibiting the use of all federal
funds for the sterilization of minors or incompetent persons, further
stagnated the number of sterilization procedures. 63 The cumulative result
154. William A. Krais, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person's Right of
Self-Determination: Right-to-Die, Sterilization and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J.L. & MED.
333, 334 (1989).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 343.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 344.
159. Krais, supra note 154, at 345.
160. Id. at 353.
161. See HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 108.
162. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.C. 1974), vacated by 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
163. See HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 108. The Relf court held that the
family planning sections of the Social Security Act and Public Health Service Act did not
authorize the federal funding for any person who, under state law, was incompetent to
consent. Ref, 372 F. Supp. at 1196. The court further held that federally assisted family
planning sterilizations are only permissible with the voluntary, knowing and uncoerced
consent of persons competent to give such consent. Id. at 1202.
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of this has been the limited accessibility of sterilizations for many women
who want them."
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Right to Privacy Cases
The genesis of the Supreme Court's recognition of the constitutional
right to privacy dates back to 1891 in the case of Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Botsford,65 where Justice Gray stated: "No right is held more sacred or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others. . . ."'6 He continued, "'The right to
one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let
alone.""
67
In 1927, Justice Brandeis alluded to the right to privacy in his famous
dissent in Olmstead v. United States.6s In the dissenting opinion, Justice
Brandeis argued that the makers of the Constitution "sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sen-
sations.', 169  He continued to say that the makers of the constitution
"conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone--the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."'7
In a succession of modem cases beginning with the landmark case of
Griswold v. Connecticut,' the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the
fundamental right to privacy. In Griswold, the Court struck down a
Connecticut statute which prohibited the use, distribution, and exchange of
knowledge concerning contraceptives." Justice Douglas, delivering the
opinion of the Court, stated that the statute exerted a "destructive impact"
on the right to marital privacy.'73 The Court's recognition of the funda-
mental right to marital privacy was legitimized as the derivative of several
164. See HAAVlK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 108.
165. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
166. Id. at 251.
167. Id.
168. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
171. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172. Id. at 486.
173. Id. at 485.
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other fundamental constitutional guarantees.174 The Court explained that
these various guarantees have "penumbras formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance." 175  The penumbras
which collectively generate the marital right to privacy include: the right of
association in the First Amendment; the prohibition against the quartering
of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner,
in the Third Amendment; the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, in the Fourth Amendment; the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment; and a part of the Ninth Amendment which provides that "'[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."",
176
Seven years later, the Supreme Court of the United States extended
Griswold to apply to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird.1"7 The
Court held that a statute prohibiting the use and distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried individuals was violative of the Equal Protection Clause
because the same type of prohibition was deemed unconstitutional as applied
to married persons. 178  The Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.' 79
In 1973, in perhaps one of the most controversial cases of the century,
Roe v. Wade, 8' the Court held that the right of privacy is "broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnan-
cy." '' The Court held that a woman has a fundamental right to get an
174. Id.
175. Id. at 484.
176. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
177. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
178. Id. at 453.
179. Id.
180. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
181. Id. at 153. The Court's support for Roe appears to be waning. In 1992, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the Court
rejected Roe's trimester framework which placed the fetus' viability at or near the last
trimester. Due in part to advances in medicine, and to a more conservative court, the new
"pregnancy timeline" is solely a function of the pre and post viability of the fetus. Viability,
defined as the point at which the fetus is presumed to be capable of a meaningful life outside
of the mother's womb, is also the time at which its interest becomes sufficiently compelling
so as to warrant protection under the Constitution. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. The state may pro-
hibit an abortion after the fetus becomes viable, provided that it does not endanger the health
of the mother. ld. at 163. Due to scientific advancements, viability occurs earlier than
1346 [Vol. 20
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 17
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/17
Adler
abortion prior to viability of the fetus, and subject to restrictions after
viability.
I s2
Again in 1973, the Court in Doe v. Bolton 13 held that the "right [to
privacy] includes the privilege of an individual to plan his own affairs, for,
'outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape
his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleas-
es.,,,184
Having established the constitutional backdrop against which Cather-
ine's right to privacy lies, this note will proceed to argue that there exists
an unenumerated fundamental right to sexuality, implicit in the Constitution.
B. The Fundamental Right to Sexuality
1. Right to Privacy Theory
Sexuality itself has been defined to encompass many concepts: male-
ness/femaleness, sensuality, sense of self, ego, perception of self in
relationship to the world and to others, and expressing or receiving an
expression of sexual interest.185 The activity of sex is perhaps the world's
oldest recreational activity.'86 The average American adult has sex fifty-
seven times a year, and over ninety-seven percent of adults have had
intercourse at least once.1" Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the
United States has never explicitly recognized the constitutional right to
sexuality, or sexual expression.' However, the Ninth Amendment has
been interpreted to establish that United States citizens have certain
previously. The time during which the woman may undergo an abortion unrestricted by the
state has lessened accordingly.
182. Id. at 164.
183. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
184. Id. at 213 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
185. ROSALYN K. MONAT-HALLER, UNDERSTANDING AND EXPRESSING SEXUALITY,
RESPONSIBLE CHOICES FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILrIES 1 (1992).
186. Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre-and
Extramarital Sex, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1660, 1660 (1991) [hereinafter Constitutional
Barriers].
187. Constitutional Barriers, supra note 186, at 1660-61.
188. The Court has noted that it "'has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private
consensual sexual] behavior among adults."' Briggs v. North Muskeegon Police Dep't, 563
F. Supp. 585, 589 (1983) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17
(1977)), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), and cert. denied, 473 U.S. 909 (1985).
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fundamental rights, even though unenumerated in the Constitution.' The
right to sexuality should be recognized as a fundamental constitutional right
because it is both implicit in the rights to privacy and First Amendment self-
expression, and inherent within the meaning of "life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness." Thus, Catherine's constitutional right to sexuality will
continue to be violated, even though permission to perform the tubal ligation
procedure may be denied.
The Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut"9 was the beginning of the process by which the Court, over
a period of twenty years, would carve out an expansive body of sexual
privacy law. 9 ' The Court held that a state cannot prohibit married
couples from receiving information about contraceptive devices because it
would violate the couple's right to marital privacy.'92 The Court's ruling
logically implies that non-procreative sexual intercourse is inherent within
the institution of marriage, and therefore protected under the doctrine of
marital privacy. This carries with it the inevitable presumption that each
married individual is entitled to freely engage in sexual relations with his or
her spouse free from state interference. The Court, reflecting the unex-
pressed wishes, needs, and desires of the populace, has expressed the right
to sexuality in a seemingly camouflaged asexual manner. The specific
language in the opinion does everything but come out and say that the state
may not interfere with a couple's right to sexual expression. For example,
Justice Douglas stated that the law, "operates directly on an intimate relation
of husband and wife. . ."" One's imagination need only go so far in
considering the implications of the phrase "intimate relation." While Justice
Douglas does not literally state that the law interfered with the couple's right
to have sexual intercourse, it is illogical to exclude this interpretation from
among the limited possibilities. Even if the phrase refers to something
exclusively cerebral or spiritual, this does not negate the fact that sexual
expression is another mode of intimate relation between husband and wife.
It is frightening to think of the day when the Court may decide for us what
distinguishes permissible intimate relations between husband and wife from
that which is impermissible.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg stated that the law
prohibiting contraceptives dealt with "a particularly important and sensitive
189. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 (1980).
190. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
191. ARTHUR S. LEONARD, SEXUALITY AND THE LAW 19 (1993).
192. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
193. Id. at 482.
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area of privacy-that of the marital relation and the marital home."1 94
Though vague, the nature of his language indicates the Court's persistent
tendency to circuitously express this constitutional right to sexuality.
Justice Goldberg then quoted Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman,"95 stating:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
[law] forbids.., but the intimacy of husband of wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an
institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and
in every age it has fostered and protected. 96
This language reflects the Court's endorsement for non-procreative
sexual expression between husband and wife, but a rejection of sexuality in
other contexts. It also underscores the extent to which the Court serves as
a "moral mouthpiece" for society-manifesting attitudes and behavior which
society deems appropriate through its rulings.'97 Ironically, eight years
later, Griswold was cited in the case of California v. LaRue 98 where
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, stated: "I have serious doubts whether the
State may constitutionally assert an interest in regulating any sexual act
between consenting adults.1 99
Griswold was subsequently extended to apply to unmarried persons as
well as married persons, in Eisenstadt v. Baird.2°  Justice Brennan's
opinion in Eisenstadt probably generated more confusion about sexual
194. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
195. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1960).
196. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
197. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the issue concerned the constitution-
ality of a sodomy statute as applied to homosexuals. In upholding the statute, Justice White
explained that fundamental rights deserving constitutional protection must be "'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,"' id. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)), or "'deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition,"' id. at 192 (quoting Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 503 (1977)). While the Court upheld the statute five to
four, Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, states his contention that the statute was
unconstitutional by touting the mental health community's newfound acceptance for
homosexuality within the area of mental health: "[d]espite historical views of homosexuality,
it is no longer viewed by mental health professionals as a 'disease' or disorder." Id. at 203
n.2.
198. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
199. Id. at 132 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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privacy for the unmarried than any other Supreme Court opinion."' Such
is the case because Justice Brennan never clarified whether the Court's
ruling was based on the notion of associational intimacy as implied in
Griswold,'0 or solely on the right of one's accessibility to contraceptives.
In Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a statute which prohibited the use
of contraceptives among unmarried persons, on the basis of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 3 The Court held that
the need to distribute contraceptives is just as great among unmarried
persons as it is for married ones.1°4 One can reasonably infer that the
corollary to the right of accessibility to contraceptives necessarily translates
into the right to engage in non-procreative intercourse, both for married and
unmarried persons.205 Through the incorporation of Stanley v. Geor-
gia,2°6 and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 7 the Court constructed an individual
right to privacy strong enough to be applied against other regulations which
prohibited abortion, fornication, and homosexual conduct.208
201. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 528 (1983).
202. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
203. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
204. Id. at 450.
205. See Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960, 966 (E.D. Va. 1985) ("Necessarily implicit
in the right to make decisions regarding childbearing is the right to engage in sexual inter-
course."); see also Constitutional Barriers, supra note 186, at 1664 ('The privacy right rec-
ognized in Griswold and Baird was not merely the right to use contraceptives; without the
corresponding right to engage in sexual intercourse such a right would be meaningless," and
"[tihe interest protected in these cases is the right to have sex free of governmental control
and to do so with or without contraceptives."); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216-18
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating, "prior cases make [it] ... abundantly clear...
[that] individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," and 'The essential 'liberty' that
animated the development of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey surely
embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others consider
offensive or immoral.").
206. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). While based on the First Amendment, the Court held that
the mere private possession of obscene material by an adult may not made criminal by the
state. Id. at 568.
207. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). On the basis of equal protection, the Court struck down a
statute which allowed for the sterilization of persons convicted three times for felonies
showing "moral turpitude," but which did not apply to other "white-collar" crimes like
embezzlement. Id.
208. See LEONARD, supra note 191, at 25.
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In 1986 the Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick,2" upheld an anti-sod-
omy 210 statute as applied to homosexuals.211 In so ruling, the Court held
that prior privacy cases could not be construed to confer a right to
homosexual behavior.1 The Court fell one vote shy of deciding that the
Constitution provided an unenumerated fundamental right to homosexual
conduct. 2
3
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the case was
not about homosexual conduct, per se, but rather, the "'right to be let
alone.' 214  His particular characterization of the matter at issue enabled
him to persuasively argue that the right to sexuality is implicit in the right
to privacy.215 Justice Blackmun reminded the Court "'that a certain
private sphere of individual liberty [should] be kept largely beyond the reach
of government.' 21 6 He stated that "sexual intimacy is a 'sensitive, key
relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of [the] human personality.' 2 17 Further, "the right
of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or
her own home seems to ... be the heart of the Constitutions's protection of
privacy. ' ' 1
Justice Powell, who voted with the majority in Bowers, later conceded
that he may have made a mistake.219 He stated, "[w]hen I had the
opportunity to reread the opinions a few months later, I thought the dissent
209. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
210. The statute provided that "[a] person commits the offense of sodomy when he
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth
or anus of another." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)
(1984)).
211. Id. at 189.
212. Id. at 194. But see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993)
(holding that criminal statute prohibiting consensual homosexual activity violates fundamental
right of privacy).
213. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187.
214. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I believe we must analyze respondent Hardwick's
claim in the light of the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy.").
216. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
217. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
218. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT'L LJ., Nov.
5, 1990, at 3.
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had the better of the arguments., 2' The ramifications of his admission
are too far-reaching for the purposes of this discussion. Of paramount
relevance, however, is that the decision would have entitled sexual activity
between consenting adults to protection under the Constitution. As Justice
Blackmun stated in the dissenting opinion, "[w]hat the Court really has
refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others.' '2
Arguably, it also would have laid to rest the confusion underlying the
Court's holding in Eisenstadt.2 2 In holding that the Constitution confers
protection upon sexual activity between consenting adults, it discounts the
theory that Eisenstadt merely stood for the right to accessibility to
contraceptives; instead, it lends credence to the view that Eisenstadt stood
for the right to associational intimacy.
The notion of sexuality as a constitutional right has been addressed on
a state level as well. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Common-
wealth v. Bonadio,223 held that a statute prohibiting "deviate sexual
~~221intercourse ' 'z A was unconstitutional.2z  The court rejected the argument
that the state was empowered to enact the statute vis-a-vis its Tenth
Amendment police power.226 Instead, it ruled that the statute's only
purpose, which was to regulate the private conduct of consenting adults,
exceeded the valid bounds of the state's police power, and infringed upon
the individual's constitutional rights to equal protection.227 In limiting the
state's ability to unduly interfere with the constitutional rights of its citizens,
the court cited the philosopher John Stuart Mill, who once said:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually, or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their num-
ber, is self-protection... [Tihe only purposes for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against
220. Id. (quoting Mr. Justice Powell in telephone interview as he elaborated on his
regretted ruling).
221. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
223. 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
224. Id. at 49. The statute defines deviate sexual intercourse as, "sexual intercourse per
os or per anus between human beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of sexual
intercourse with an animal." Id. at 49 n.1 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (1973)).
225. Id. at 50.
226. Id. at 49-50.
227. Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 50.
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his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral is not a sufficient warrant.'
Perhaps one of the most telling of all sexuality cases that fall within the
framework of the privacy doctrine is the Supreme Court of New Jersey case
of State v. Saunders.' In Saunders, the court struck down an anti-
fornication23" statute, holding that it was unconstitutional. 231 The court
held that sexual activities between consenting adults are protected within the
right to privacy. 32 The premise for the court's ruling was that a decision
to engage in consensual sexual activity was at least as intimate and personal
as those involving decisions on whether to use contraceptives. 233  Of
particular significance in Saunders, was the introduction of behavioral and
social science data to establish the psycho-sexual significance of non-marital
intercourse, and the frequency and acceptance of such behavior.' An
expert witness 235 had testified that:
the sex chive is instinctive, and is, a biologic force that is a central fact-
or, not only in personality development, but also at the practical office
level of treating problems .... When this drive is involuntarily pro-
scribed, guilt and anxiety problems can arise and frequently create resid-
ual problems many years later. 1 6
228. Id.
229. 381 A.2d 333 (NJ. 1977).
230. Fornication is defined as: "sexual intercourse other than between married persons."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 653 (6th ed. 1990).
231. Saunders, 381 A.2d at 339.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 340. Saunders was not the first state court to hold that fornication was
protected by the right to privacy. See also State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (1976).
In Pilcher, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a statute barring acts of sodomy between
consenting adults of the opposite sex was unconstitutional because it invaded their
fundamental right to privacy. Id Similarly, in Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp.
449, 459 (1979), the court held that private sexual activity between consenting adults is
within the zone of privacy protected from unwarranted government intrusion. Id.
234. See Richard Green, Fornication: Common Law Legacy and American Sexual
Privacy, 17 ANGLO-AMER. L. REv. 226, 229 (1988).
235. Richard Green, the expert witness who testified in Saunders, authored the law
review article from which the accompanying text was taken. See also RICHARD GREEN,
SCIENCE AND THE LAW (1992) (discussing many issues involving the relationship between
sexuality and the Constitution from legal, as well as psycho-sexual and medical perspectives).
236. Green, supra note 234, at 229-30.
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Justice Bedford, the trial judge in Saunders, later commented that while
the impact of this testimony was minimal in his ruling, the nature of the
evidence could be useful in these types of cases.237 Justice Schreiber, a
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice who wrote the concurring opinion in
Saunders, stated in an interview after the case that his decision was
primarily based on the notion of privacy.238 He said, "if [sexual] conduct
is such that it doesn't affect anybody else, no third person is affected, or the
state isn't affected, then we're getting into the zone of privacy. 239
The advancement and consideration of this type of evidence in other
lower level court decisions could profoundly affect the future of the modem
privacy doctrine. To the extent that such evidence leads to analogous
rulings in other courts, the Supreme Court of the United States may have
incentive and support to re-evaluate its position concerning privacy law as
it relates to the notion of sexual expression between consenting adults.
2. First Amendment Right to Self-Expression Theory
The concept of sexual expression has found its way to the Supreme
Court in other contexts as well, notably that of the First Amendment. Over
the past twenty years, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled on
the constitutionality of various regulations on nude dancing.2' In Califor-
nia v. LaRue,241 the Court held that live nude dancing may be entitled to
constitutional protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments under
certain circumstances.242 Justice Brennan, in his dissent, stated that
"nothing in the language or history of the Twenty-First Amendment
authorizes the states to use their liquor licensing power as a means for the
deliberate inhibition of protected, even if distasteful, forms of expres-
sion." '43 Justice Marshall, in his dissent, said that "once it is recognized
that movies and plays enjoy prima facie First Amendment protection, the
standard for reviewing state regulation of their component parts shifts
dramatically." 2" Marshall's statement implies that sexual expression,
which would be protected under the First Amendment within the context of
237. Id. at 231.
238. Id. at 232.
239. Id.
240. Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REV. 177, 287 (1991).
241. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
242. Id. at 118.
243. Id. at 123 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 130 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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artistic expression in a play or painting, for instance, may be entitled to
similar constitutional protection in other contexts.
Eight years later, in Schad v. Mount Ephraim,2 45 the Court struck
down a zoning ordinance which prohibited the existence of all nude dance
clubs.2 The Court held that nude dancing is not without its First Amend-
ment protections from official regulation.247 Because the zoning ordinance
was held violative of the First Amendment right to self-expression, it was
reviewed under higher scrutiny which required the zoning ordinance to be
narrowly tailored to advance a sufficiently substantial government inter-
est.24 The Court held that the ordinance was overbroad,249 and not
based in furtherance of a substantial government interest.' Justice White,
delivering the opinion of the court, stated that "'Nudity alone' does not
place otherwise protected material outside the mantel of the First Amend-
ment.
2 51
Ten years later, the Court was again confronted with the constitutional-
ity of nude dancing in Barnes v. Glen Theater 52 Until Barnes, however,
the Court had not explicitly clarified whether nude dancing was protected
expression.5 3 In Barnes, the Court held, in a five to four decision, that
a statute proscribing totally nude dancing was not violative of the First
Amendment.' Specifically, the Court held that nude dancing, though
expressive conduct, "falls within the outer perimeters of the First Amend-
ment."2"5 In arriving at its decision, the Court relied on the test estab-
245. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 66.
248. Id. at 68.
249. The statute was held overbroad because it excluded all types of live entertainment,
including non-obscene nude dancing that is otherwise protected by the first amendment. Id.
at 76.
250. The court rejected Mount Ephraim's claim that permitting the live entertainment
would have conflicted with its plan to create a commercial area that caters only to the
immediate needs of its residents. Schad, 452 U.S. at 72. It also concluded that Mount
Ephraim lacked any evidence in support of its claim that live entertainment posed problems
otherwise avoidable by other permitted uses. Id. at 73. Finally, the court held that there was
no evidence for the borough's contention that live entertainment was incompatible with the
uses which were already permitted by the borough. Id. at 75.
251. Id. at 66.
252. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
253. See Leading Cases, supra note 240, at 287.
254. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563.
255. Id. at 566.
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lished in United States v. O'Brien,2 56 which has been applied to regula-
tions imposed upon symbolic speech. The Court stated that a regulation will
be upheld under O'Brien "if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. 25 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the purpose of the
statute was to "protect societal order and morality, 258 and that was within
the state's Tenth Amendment police power to regulate for the public health,
safety, and morals of the state." 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded by
holding that the statute indeed furthered a substantial government interest,
and that this interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression2
because the dancers were still permitted to express erotic messages provided
that they wore pasties, and G-strings.261
Writing for the dissent, Justice White argued that the statute was
content based, and only served to prohibit nudity that fell within the specific
context of nude dancing.262 As a content based statute, it warranted strict
scrutiny. Justice White proceeded to argue that the majority had fallen prey
to its subjective biases in rejecting nudity when it occurs in strip bars, but
protecting it if within a ballet:
While the entertainment afforded by nude ballet at Lincoln Center to
those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by
judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in
substance from the dance viewed by the person who ... wants some
"entertainment...., 263
Justice White stated the element of total nudity in this type of dancing
served to elicit "emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the
256. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
257. Id. at 377.
258. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568.
259. Id. at 569.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 571.
262. Id. at 589 (White, J., dissenting).
263. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 594 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank,
501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974), affd in part sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922 (1975)).
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spectators. '  Finally, Justice White stated that "generating thoughts,
ideas, and emotions, is the essence of communication."265
The dissenting opinion in Barnes, falling one vote shy of the majority,
lends support to the view that sexuality, as a form of self-expression, should
be entitled to constitutional protection under the First Amendment. If four
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States agree that nude dancing
in strip bars is worthy of constitutional protection, it is hard to reconcile
how the act of intimacy as a means of expressing love, togetherness, and
one's sexual identity, between two consenting adults, is not worthy of as
much protection. To be sure, the potentially negative secondary effects
stemming from nude dancing bars are non-existent with private sexual
relations between consenting adults.266 With the exception of sex crimes
such as rape, sexual assault, child sexual abuse, or public acts of nudity, the
government has no legitimate interest to advance. To the extent that any
given sexual act does not infringe on the participants' or other persons'
rights, it should not be subject to the state's Tenth Amendment police
power.
Sigmund Freud once said that "sex is not something we do, it's
something we are."'267 Sexuality has been defined to be everything that
has to do with being a man or woman.2 Said to be inextricably woven
with one's personality,269 the concept of one's sexual identity encompasses
three components.27 "The first is the core awareness of belonging to one
of two categories of persons-male or female.""27  This component
264. Id. at 592 (White, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
266. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1988) (holding that zoning ordi-
nance designed to reduce concentration of nude dancing bars was rational means for state to
reduce crime and protect property values).
267. BENJAMIN A. KOGAN, HUMAN SEXUAL ExPRESSION 2 (1973).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 3.
270. See GREEN, supra note 235, at 51.
271. Id.; see also RONALD A. LATORRE, SEXUAL IDENTrY 15 (1979). This belief is
largely dependent on both the person's perception of his or her body image and on the
messages received from significant others. Id. This is arguably the most important sub
category because it is mainly subconscious and can affect the development of other areas.
Id. One's physical gender does not necessarily translate into a congruent sense of self.
Some individuals are so discontent with having been born male or female, that they even-
tually undergo a sex change. See GREEN, supra note 235, at 52. They are known as
"transsexuals." The notion of transsexuality serves to emphasize the degree to which one's
sense of maleness or femaleness can be independent of and override one's physical make-up.
To the extent that it is a function of one's mind as opposed to the body, it lends support to
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"permeat[es] nearly all behavior."2' Studies have indicated that the emer-
gence of this characteristic occurs as early as thirteen months of age.27 3
The second component relates to the core of one's gender-masculinity and
femininity.274 One's sense of masculinity or femininity is also manifested
early.275 Masculine and feminine behavior generally develop together with
the self-concept of maleness or femaleness.27 6  The third component
concerns sexual orientation." One's sexual identity-the selection of
male or female sexual partners, or sexual orientation-is so profound that it
is commonly used to actually define the person.
the argument that one's sexual identity or sense of sexuality is inherently cognitive, and not
just merely a physical response. As such, it should be protected to the same extent as other
forms of self-expression. No psychological or physiological explanation has been offered to
conclusively resolve why some males and females are transsexual. Id. at 102.
272. GREEN, supra note 235, at 51.
273. Id. The age at which this feature becomes psychologically integrated is not known
with 100% certainty, but some evidence suggest that the recognition of two classes of
humans based on gender, occurs as early as thirteen months. Id.
274. See id at 52; see also JANET T. SPENCE & ROBERT L. HELMREICH, MASCULINITY
& FEMININITY, THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS, CORRELATES, & ANTECEDENTS 4 (1978)
("Men and women are typically assumed to possess different temperamental characteristics
and abilities-distinctive sets of attributes whose existence is used to justify the perpetuation
of the society's role structure or whose inculcation is believed to be necessary if members
of each sex are to fulfill their assigned functions."). Evidence suggests that sex-role differ-
entiations are highly shapeable. Id. at 5. Various environmental factors including political,
sociological, and economic forces have been determined to play a part in the shaping of
one's sense of masculinity or femininity. Id. To the extent that this is mental and not physi-
cal, and to the extent that it is manifested through one's sexuality, it lends additional support
to the argument that sexual expression is a form of cognitive expression, and should,
consequently, be entitled to First Amendment protection. See also Susan R. Walen & David
Roth, A Cognitive Approach, in THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALrrY, supra note 186, at 335.
In one longitudinal study, a pair of identical twins was observed for research concerning
gender development. One infant, due to an accident at circumcision, lost his penis. He was
reared as a girl, and his brother was reared as a boy, each successfully developed a different
gender role. See GREEN, supra note 235, at 51.
275. GREEN, supra note 235, at 51.
276. Id. at 52; see also LATORRE, supra note 271, at 26 ("By the age of four or five
years, almost every child says that when he grows up he will be a parent of the appropriate
sex [i.e. daddy if he is a boy and mommy if she is a girl]."). Children as young as three
have been found to make fairly accurate distinctions between male and female types of
activities. GREEN, supra note 235, at 52.
277. GREEN, supra note 235, at 53.
278. Id. at 53. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ('The court recognized in Roberts, 468 U.S., at 619, that the 'ability independent-
ly to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty' cannot truly be exercised
in a vacuum; we all depend on the 'emotional enrichment from close ties with others."').
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The foregoing psychological construct lends support to the argument
that sexuality is a physical product of sophisticated cognitive processes. The
various components or stages of psycho-sexual development all underscore
the extent to which one's sexuality is a function of the mind279 as opposed
to the body. In essence, it is a manifestation of one's inner self, identity,
and emotions. Nonetheless, one must be careful not to dismiss it as an
exclusively cerebral function. A number of noted psychologists have
incorporated sexuality into hierarchical models of development, where it is
classified as a human need, in the absence of which psychological problems
may ensue.28 °
As a manifestation of one's emotions, feelings, identity, self, gender,
and sense of eroticism, sexuality is the embodiment of human self-
expression at the most fundamental level. Similar to art, speech, and other
forms of expression, sexuality is worthy of First Amendment protection. To
the extent that it involves consenting adults and does not infringe on another
person's rights, it is no less a form of communication than any other, and
should be treated as such.
C. Right to Habilitation
In Wyatt v. Stickney,2"' the court held that mentally disabled persons
who are confined to institutions have a constitutional right to "adequate and
effective treatment."2"2 The court mandated a list of minimum constitu-
279. See, e.g., Walen & Roth, supra note 275, at 335 (exploring various cognitive
theories for sexuality and sexual development); see also, Igor S. Kon, A Sociocultural
Approach, in THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY, supra note 186, at 280 ("Human sexuality
is not a simple biological given and cannot be explained solely in terms of reproductive
biology or in terms of instinctive behavior.").
280. See RICHARD M. LERNER, CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
310-18 (1986) (describing Erikson's eight stages of personality development, a psychological
life cycle model, within which sexuality plays integral part); see also Lisa A. Serbin & Carol
H. Sprafkin, A Developmental Approach, Sexuality from Infancy Through Adolescence, in
THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY, supra note 186, at 163 (explaining how various cognitive,
social, and affective phenomena involved in sexuality are interrelated throughout the
developmental process).
281. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
282. Id. at 390. In support of its holding, the court cited a resolution entitled: "Dec-
laration on the Rights of the Mentally Retarded." Id. Adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on December 27, 1971, the resolution read in, pertinent part: "[tihe
mentally retarded person has a right to proper medical care and physical therapy and to such
education, training, rehabilitation, and guidance as will enable him to develop his ability and
maximum potential." Id, at 391.
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tional standards for adequate habilitation8 3 of the mentally retarded.284
Of notable relevance was the right to a "humane psychological and physical
environment. ' '285  Specifically, the standards require that "residents shall
have a right to dignity, privacy and humane care,' 286 and that "the institu-
tion shall provide, under appropriate supervision, suitable opportunities for
the resident's interaction with members of the opposite sex. 287
In Youngberg v. Romeo,2 8 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that mentally disabled persons have constitutionally protected liberty
interests to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from
unreasonable bodily restraints, and "such [minimally adequate] training as
may be required by these interests. 28 9 In Youngberg, a mentally disabled
man who had been committed to a state institution, was involuntarily
restrained for extended periods of time as a result of his violent behav-
ior.2'° The Court remanded the case to the district court to balance the
patient's liberty interest with the state's interest, so that they might
determine whether the physical restraints imposed on the patient were
excessive, and whether they fell short of the minimally adequate standards
of habilitation to which the patient was constitutionally entitled.
VI. APPLICATION
A. Catherine's Right to Privacy
While in the community living arrangement, Catherine is under
211
constant supervision. Some testimony indicated that she is checked
every ten minutes.2" While it is necessary to monitor Catherine's precari-
ous medical condition, this degree of oversight was also explained to be
"primarily to prevent sexual activity."'2 93 This implies that the overriding
283. The court defined "habilitation" as: "[t]he process by which the staff of the
institution assists the resident to acquire and maintain those life skills which enable him to
cope more effectively with the demands of his own person and of his environment and to
raise the level of his physical, mental and social efficiency." Id. at 395.
284. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 395 app. A.
285. Id. at 399.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
289. Id. at 324.
290. Id. at 310.
291. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 9, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 10.
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concern is that Catherine may become pregnant.294 However, a number
of sexually related incidents were cited in the record to have occurred
despite this unrelenting supervision.295 On one occasion, while visiting
Catherine at her group home, her mother noticed a young man standing
outside Catherine's door while she was undressing.296 Another time, a
male resident who lived in the group home was seen leaving Catherine's
bedroom, and she was found in bed crying, with her nightgown raised.2
These incidents underscore the inadequacy of her supervision, and raise the
concern of how many incidents may have gone undetected.
Finally, medical testimony indicates that Catherine's hymen is not
intact and she does not have a virginal tract.29 This fact, together with
Catherine's overly affectionate nature,2 99 clearly indicates that, short of a
live-in guardian, no amount of supervision could adequately guarantee her
complete sexual abstinence.
This type of unceasing supervision imposed on Catherine constitutes an
ongoing infraction on her fundamental constitutional right to privacy.
Common to all of the aforesaid right to privacy cases is the inherent right
to be let alone.3° Yet, because of the fear that Catherine may become
pregnant, she never has more than ten minutes free from intrusion.01 The
sterilization procedure would eliminate the possibility that Catherine could
ever become pregnant, and there would be no need for the constant
interference with her right to privacy. Her right to privacy would be
restored to the extent that her supervision was not medically necessary." 2
No contraceptive could provide this guarantee without causing harmful side
effects.303
294. See supra part II.A.
295. See supra part II.A.
296. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 10, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970).
297. Id. Catherine indicated that the male resident had touched her breasts and hips.
Id.
298. Id. at 4.
299. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
300. See supra part V.A. The precise parameters for the right to privacy have never
been defined. Consequently, the Supreme Court is afforded greater flexibility in its
interpretation and application of the concept. Though Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and Bolton
do not explicitly recognize the right to be let alone, it is implicit in the right to privacy.
301. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 9, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970).
302. Id. at 9-11.
303. See supra part II.D.
Adler 1361
39
Adler: Estate of C.W.: A Pragmatic Approach to the Involuntary Steriliza
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
B. Catherine's Right to Sexuality
It has been said that "sexual activity for the mentally handi-
capped-whether heterosexual, homosexual or masturbation-is abhorrent to
people, even though there is enlightened clamor for understanding the
handicapped at home and in the community. ' '3 4 Historically, the preva-
lent view has been that mentally disabled persons "should not be allowed to
engage in any sexual activity whatsoever.'30 5  The time has come for
society to recognize that, as human beings, mentally disabled persons are
entitled to develop, express, and enjoy their sexuality to the same extent as
anyone else.3°  Catherine is no exception. Up to this point in her
life,30 7 she has been deprived of her fundamental right to sexuality. She
has had neither the opportunity to decide whether to engage in sexual
relations, nor the ability to express herself sexually if she so wished.0 8
It is known that developmentally disabled persons "need more
opportunities to learn how to relate appropriately in social and sexual
situations."3" Under the appropriate level of guidance and direction,
Catherine should, to the extent that she is able, be permitted to enjoy a
sexual relationship with a male whose level of intellectual functioning
approximates her own. This would preserve her fundamental right to
304. George W. Lee, The Sexual Rights of The Retarded-An International Point of
View, in SEXUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 58 (Medora
S. Bass et a]. eds., 1973) (quoting Dr. J.M. Kahn from the August 1972 issue of the British
Medical Journal).
305. HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 8.
306. Id.
307. That is, up until the time of Catherine's sterilization.
308. Due to Catherine's cognitive limitations, no exploration was made into whether she
could in fact consent to sexual activity. See Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, supra
note 58. Catherine's sexual partners could potentially face criminal charges pursuant to 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3121(4) (Supp. 1995) ("A person commits a felony of the first
degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse.., who
is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapable of consent."); see also 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 311 (c)(2) (Supp. 1995), which provides:
Ineffective consent-Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law
defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if: ... it is given by a
person who by reason of ... mental disease or defect... is manifestly unable
or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the
nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense[.]
Id. This note will not address the ramifications of Catherine's ability or inability to consent.
Though it is certainly worthy of further consideration, it exceeds the scope of this discussion.
309. HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 26.
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sexuality, and minimize the possibility of her being infected by a sexually
transmitted disease, and/or being sexually exploited.3'0
C. Catherine's Right to Habilitation
As a result of the deprivation of Catherine's right to privacy and
sexuality, her right to habilitation is undermined as well. As held in Wyatt,
Catherine has a constitutional right to a humane psychological environ-
ment.311 One may inevitably conclude that, without the tubal ligation,
Catherine is not living in a humane psychological environment. With the
exception of the evening, when Catherine goes to sleep, she never has more
than ten or fifteen minutes to herself. While this is necessary to prevent
Catherine from becoming pregnant, it could nevertheless be avoided if she
were permitted to be sterilized. Even if one does conclude that such
treatment is not inhumane, it still invariably frustrates her right to privacy,
as provided within the context of habilitation.
Catherine's lack of opportunity to engage in sexual relations further
undermines her right to habilitation.312  The essence of habilitation is
"making available to mentally retarded patterns and conditions of everyday
life which are [as] close as possible to the norms and patterns of the
mainstream of society. 31 3  Implicit in the concept of habilitation or
normalization is the recognition that the mentally disabled are sexual
beings.1 4 Without the tubal ligation, Catherine is not free to engage in
a healthy intimate relationship. As provided in Wyatt, Catherine should
have the opportunity to interact with members of the opposite sex. 315
310. If Catherine was not given the appropriate level of guidance and supervision, there
would exist the danger of sexual abuse by males who were functioning at higher intellectual
levels. There would also exist potential health problems with respect to the transmission of
sexual diseases. By requiring Catherine, and her mate, to be subject to some degree of
supervision or guidance in the beginning of their relationship, the potential onset of health
related problems would be minimized.
311. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. 387, 399 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
312. See discussion supra note 282 (describing the creation of the "Declaration on the
Rights of the Mentally Retarded"); see also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 381 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (holding that mentally ill persons who are confined to institutions have a
constitutional right to "adequate treatment," including "suitable opportunities for the patient's
interaction with members of the opposite sex"). Subsequently, in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), the Court extended its prior holding to apply to the mentally
disabled as well as the mentally ill. Id
313. RowE & SAVAGE, supra note 53, at 10.
314. See HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 8.
315. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 399.
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Finally, the Court in Youngberg held that a court must show deference
to the judgment exercised by qualified professionals with respect to the
particular issues of habilitation.316 Sufficient psychological evidence exists
to lend support to the contention that the deprivation of Catherine's privacy
and sexuality interests restricts her healthy psychological development,
thereby undermining the chief objective of habilitation.317
VII. CONCLUSION: BALANCING TEST OF CATHERINE'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The world's historic fascination with eugenics31 8 demands an inquiry
into any potential infractions on Catherine's constitutional rights which may
result from the sterilization procedure. In Youngberg, the Supreme Court
applied a balancing test consisting of the mentally disabled person's various
liberty interests weighed against the legitimate interests of the state
9
.
31
The Court stated that "[b]ecause the facts in cases of confinement of men-
tally retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and
circumstances of the case before the court. '320 This type of pragmatic
approach ensures that the Court's decision is narrowly tailored to the
particular needs of the mentally disabled person. The court must be careful
not to lose its objectivity as a result of the temptation to compensate for its
historical prejudices against the mentally disabled.32' In a case such as
this, it is particularly important for the court to use the "totality of the
circumstances" approach because the sterilization procedure was sought
strictly out of medical necessity. Catherine's mental disability was only one
factor to be considered among many.
With that in mind, we may proceed by first identifying the various
interests involved. The state's interests include the following: first, the
protection of Catherine's right to privacy with respect to the decision of
whether to undergo the sterilization; and second, the preservation of her
right to procreate. Pitted against the state's foregoing interests is Catherine's
mother's interest in protecting her daughter's following constitutional rights:
first, her right to privacy with respect to her right to be let alone; second,
316. Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
317. See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
318. See supra part III.
319. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
320. Id. at 319 n.25.
321. See supra part III.
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her right to sexuality; third, her right to adequate habilitation; and fourth, her
right to continuation of life.3"
We may begin by examining the state's interest in protecting Cathe-
rine's right to privacy. Her privacy interests have been invaded to the extent
that the permission to perform the operation may be issued absent her
consent. In analyzing Catherine's rights to privacy, it is vital to do so in
light of her mental disability. Because of Catherine's level of cognitive
functioning, it is necessary for her mother and others who care for her to
aggressively assert her best interests for her. To the extent that she is
unable to care for herself or make well-informed decisions, they have a duty
to compensate by acting as surrogate decision makers.3" As a result of
Catherine's disability, her life is necessarily regulated and protected by those
around her.
322. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court held that during the second trimes-
ter of pregnancy, the state may protect its interest in the mother's life and health, by
regulating an abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to same. Id. at 163-64.
The Court further held that during the third trimester, the state must allow the mother to
abort her viable fetus if it is for the purpose of preserving her life or health. Id. at 165-66.
Four years later, in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 677 (1977), the Court upheld
its ruling in Roe, which held that, even after viability, the state may not regulate or proscribe
abortion if it interferes with the mother's right to life or health. Id. at 686. In providing that
the mother's right to life supersedes that of her viable fetus, the Court has revealed its
primary interest in taking whatever means necessary to protect a woman's right to continued
life and health. Id. While Roe and Carey involved different scenarios than this case, they
are analogous because of the overriding interest in protecting a pregnant mother's maternal
life and health. However, Catherine's mother is not afforded the liberty to wait until her
daughter becomes pregnant, because of Catherine's fragile epileptic condition. Rather, her
mother must ensure that her daughter avoids the potentially irreversible, life-endangering
situation which could arise, were she to become pregnant. To the extent that a potential
pregnancy could put Catherine into a life-endangering situation, her mother has an interest
in protecting her daughter's right to continued life by way of the tubal ligation procedure.
The right to life itself is arguably the most fundamental of all constitutional rights. A
decision to deny Catherine's mother the authorization to permit Catherine's sterilization
would trivialize Catherine's right to life, and consequently, leave her and those who cared
for her in constant peril.
323. See Scott, supra note 135, at 841.
Some mentally disabled persons are not competent to make reproductive deci-
sions for themselves. A decision about sterilization made on behalf of an
individual in this category violates no interest in reproductive autonomy; when
a person is incapable of making her own decision, others must determine whether
sterilization is in her best interest. . . . The desirability of the procedure may
depend on nonreproductive considerations such as medical risks and benefits,
human dignity, privacy, and family continuity....
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In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,324 the Supreme Court
of the United States held, in a five to four decision, that the parents of a
woman who had fallen into a persistent vegetative state as a result of a car
accident, had the right to exercise their daughter's constitutional right to
refuse continued artificial nutrition and hydration procedures if there was
clear and convincing evidence to indicate that their daughter would have
chosen to, were she so able.325 The Court's decision indicates that a
showing of clear and convincing evidence regarding an incompetent person's
intent may permit a guardian to assert her rights for her. While this may be
characterized as a substituted judgment, it is predicated exclusively on the
best interests of the disabled person who is incapable of asserting his or her
own rights.
In this case, while the facts may be different, the ultimate objective is
the same-to protect the best interests of Catherine who is incapable of
making such a determination on her own. Cruzan implicitly stands for the
proposition that a guardian may assert the best interests of his or her child
in the event that the child is incapable of doing so.326 Consequently,
Catherine's mother should be permitted to make certain types of decisions
for her despite her theoretical lack of consent, because it is in her best
interest.327 The overriding concern for Catherine's life dwarfs the de
minimis privacy intrusion which she would suffer as a result of the tubal
ligation procedure.
Catherine's right to procreate must be precisely defined in view of her
medical predicament. It cannot be emphasized enough that the tubal ligation
procedure was strictly being sought as a means through which Catherine's
mother could protect her daughter's right to continuation of life. The
laparoscopy should therefore be considered in the same light as any other
medically necessary procedure. As stated earlier, one must resist the
temptation to analyze the issue within the central context of Catherine's
mental disability. Her mental disability was not the motivation for the
procedure. Her medical condition was. Catherine's mental disability only
becomes relevant to the extent of its limitation on her autonomy, her
324. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
325. Id. at 284-85.
326. See id.
327. See supra part II.C.
328. See A. JEFFERSON PENFIELD, FEMALE STERILIZATION BY MINILAPAROTOMY OR
OPEN LAPAROSCOPY 7-9 (1980). The tubal ligation procedure is relatively simple. It
consists of a belly-button size incision through which the Fallopian tubes are burned or cut
to prevent the ova from entering the uterus. Id.
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heightened dependability on those around her, and the distorted context of
the fundamental rights which have been consequently implicated.
The potential life-endangering risks facing both Catherine and her
fetus, were she to become pregnant, necessarily place her right to procreate
in a different light than that of a healthy woman who has no such risks. In
Cruzan, Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, argued that the state's
proclaimed interest in protecting the incompetent person's right to life,
which was being artificially sustained, was abstract.32 9 He stated that be-
cause of the person's irreversible vegetative state and the fact that such a
person is incapable of thought, emotion or sensation, the state's interest in
protecting that life is quite different from protecting that of a healthy
person.330 Catherine's right to procreate is also abstractly defined because
of the virtual impossibility that she could ever carry her pregnancy to term.
As a result, the state's interest in protecting her right to procreate becomes
lessened accordingly, especially when considered against Catherine's other
fundamental rights which would be upheld as a result of the tubal ligation,
such as her rights to privacy, sexuality, habilitation, and life.
While it is highly improbable that Catherine's mental or physical
condition will change, the theoretical ramifications of her sterilization and
their relationship to her fundamental right to procreate should nevertheless
be addressed. In the event that Catherine was empowered to rear a child,
she would have a number of options available to her. First, she could adopt.
This would enable her to avoid the physical complications associated with
pregnancy. Second, she could have the effect of the operation surgically
reversed.33 ' Alternatively, she could give birth through the use of in vitro
fertilization.332
To the extent that Catherine is entirely dependent on those around her,
the need to salvage any degree of freedom which she may otherwise have,
should prevail over any accompanying de minimis infractions which she
may incidentally suffer. The tubal ligation procedure would remove the
329. 497 U.S. at 272 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
330. Id. at 313-14, 317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
331. See PENFIELD, supra note 328, at 98. Catherine's fallopian tubes could be
reconstructed to give her the capability to become pregnant again, by either minilaparotomy
or open laparoscopy. The success rate for the reversal of the tubal ligation procedure is
approximately 82%. Id.
332. A procedure in which ova are removed from the woman's ovaries and fertilized
in a petri dish using a donor's sperm. The fertilized egg is then transferred into the woman's
uterus. Id.
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threat of pregnancy, and consequently eliminate the need for the relentless
privacy infractions which Catherine continuously endures. To the extent
that her supervision is not medically necessary, Catherine could finally have
the opportunity to be let alone in peace to think, to muse. She would also
gain the opportunity to enjoy a sexual relationship with someone of the
opposite sex. While these rights are oftentimes taken for granted by most,
they are long-awaited, and far overdue freedoms for Catherine. With them,
she would no longer be left to simply "exist" with the constant threat of
death looming over her.
After twenty-six years, Catherine could finally begin to live life as a
human being.
Robert Randal Adler333
333. J.D. candidate, January 1997, Thomas M. Cooley Law School.
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